OPIRS / Security & Trust
Security is a design constraint
Public web, knowledge publication, Mother Core and future child coordination are separate services with least-privilege credentials and defined trust boundaries.
Rewards security: The planned OCC verification and ledger services will have separate credentials and permissions from Mother Core. Children never connect directly to PostgreSQL, Redis or the research execution environment. Read the audit architecture.
Trust boundaries
Public OPIRS website · Mother Voice · Secure API
↑ Read-only published information
Published knowledge · Provenance · Capability manifest
↑ Reviewed, outward-only publication
Private Mother Core · Experiment governance · PostgreSQL
↕ Governed task orchestration (future)
Private coordinator · Redis Streams · Verified child results
↕ Authenticated gateway, never direct Redis access
Opt-in Linux · Windows · macOS · Mobile clients
Core security principles
- Separate Docker projects, networks, identities and credentials for public services and Mother Core.
- No public PostgreSQL, Redis, Docker socket or Mother execution interface.
- Approved outbound-only knowledge publication; no reverse public control channel.
- HTTPS, rate limiting, authentication, least privilege and strict API resource budgets.
- Signed client releases, revocable identities, sandboxed tasks and independently checked results.
- Host hardening, backups, logging, incident response and a public-service kill switch.
Containers share a kernel. Single-VPS isolation reduces exposure but does not provide the assurance of separate virtual machines. Public deployment requires a documented threat model and testing.